Exploring creativity as a component of the manufacturing or making process: implications for assessment by John R. Dakers (7152026)
DATA International Research Conference 2004 
Creativity and Innovation
Exploring Creativity as a Component of the
Manufacturing or Making Process: Implications for
Assessment
John Dakers, University of Glasgow, Scotland
Abstract
Creativity is acknowledged to be an essential
feature of design and technology (D&T). However,
the current literature which explores aspects of
creativity in D&T tends to portray the creative
process as residing more in the design or problem-
solving arena, as distinct from the action of
manufacturing or making an end product. (Atkinson.
2002, Barlex. 2003, Davies T. 2002b, Davies L.
2002a, LTS. 2001, Rutland. 2002). 
This paper will set out to explore whether aspects of
creativity are actually present within the
manufacturing or making domain. It will investigate
whether the creative process is an action which can
only occur in the process of manufacture or making,
or if the creative process can be implicitly embedded
within the actual finished product itself.  
The paper will argue that there are two distinct
forms of activity involved in the process of
manufacture, which I will term ‘artistic craftsmanship’
and ‘technical craftsmanship’. The first type, it will be
argued, involves a creative process whereas the
second involves a skill process. 
By exploring the distinction between ‘artistic
craftsmanship’ and ‘technical craftsmanship’,
moreover, the paper will explore whether creative
endeavour can be recognised as an implicit value
inherent within some end physical form. For
example, does Michelangelo’s ‘David’, as an actual
physical object, exhibit some inherent quality that in
itself, demonstrates some form of creativity. Would a
copy be considered creative? 
The paper will finish by considering the implications
for the assessment of an end product. If ‘artistic
craftsmanship’ is not inherent and embedded in the
end product, the assessment of the finished product
alone can take account of only ‘technical
craftsmanship’ displayed in the quality of the
product. Creative aspects, it will be argued, are not
displayed in the product alone, and cannot,
therefore, be assessed in the product alone. 
“Now thou knowest that no man can manifest any
skill, nor exercise any power, without tools or
material; that is the material of each craft, without
which it cannot be exercised…[t]herefore I desire
material with which to exercise power, that my skill
and power should not be forgotten and lost sight of.
For every kind of skill and power quickly grows old
and is passed over in silence, if it is devoid of
wisdom; because no one can manifest any skill
without wisdom, since whatsoever is done foolishly
can never be accounted as skill”. King Alfred’s
Version of Boethius written in the eighteenth century
(Cook and Tinker, 1968:2)
Creativity is an ambiguous and problematic term. The
creativity of an actor upon the stage is not the same
as that which the artist displays at her easel nor the
wood turner at her lathe. The ‘Creation’ in Biblical
terms is yet another manifestation and the wildly
imaginative justification given by the pupil for failure to
hand in homework, although different in form, can
certainly be defined as creative, albeit frustrating.
However, one common feature inherent within the
concept of creativity is that something manifest is
brought into being. The actor brings a character into
being, the artist a painting, the turner a bowl. The
earth was given physical form by its creator
according to the Bible and the pupil’s excuse is
manifest in the form of a narrative. But inherent
within this common feature, is a tension, a duality of
forms. The action of ‘bringing something into being’,
requires that ‘something’ to take one of two forms:
three-dimensional physical form, or one that
transcends the physical, as in a performance. These
two forms can, in some cases, become reliant upon
each other, as in a musician playing an instrument,
but the object brought into being is only ever
constituted in one form or the other:  the
performance of the musician creating music on the
instrument, or the physicality of the instrument itself.
Observing the sculptor sculpt qua observing the
sculptor sculpt, is different from appreciating the end
product the sculptor has sculpted, and for some
audiences, one will be preferable to the other.
Whichever form the bringing into being takes,
whether perpetrated by the actor, wood turner, artist
or even the devious pupil, the object of the activity
(that which is produced), requires some form of
intentional activity to be enacted upon it by the
subject (the producer), in order to ‘bring’ the creation
‘into being’. The quality of the resultant object will
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depend upon the perceived experience and ability of
the subject, or more simply, their level of skill in that
particular domain.
The object of their craft, whether or not it is in
physical form, requires some demonstrable and
perceivable end product that results from a
deliberate, cognitive and intentional action. Where
an action is devoid of these instruments it is
unintentional, accidental and cannot, ipso facto be
creative. Putnam (2002:524) offers an interesting
analogy for this; he makes the case for an ant,
which, crawling on a patch of sand, traces out a
recognisable caricature of Winston Churchill. ‘Has
the ant traced a picture of Winston Churchill, a
picture that depicts Churchill?’. Most would be
unlikely to attribute to the ant the requisite skill in
caricature.  Indeed, even if the ant had seen
Churchill or a picture of Churchill, most would
seriously doubt that the ant had the capacity to
remember that image and subsequently recreate it.
Whilst fantastic, it would nevertheless be an act of
serendipity. The ant, I would contend, had no
intention of depicting Churchill. This notion indicates
that for any deliberate creative action to occur,
there must exist some form of intentionality on the
part of the creator. 
This intentionality may, however, be consequential
upon factors external to the creator. Whilst it may be
happenstance that an opportunity presents itself and
is subsequently incorporated into the ‘product,’ it
nevertheless involves a subsequent deliberate,
cognitive intention on the part of the creator. The
pupil, like the actor, when ‘caught out by
circumstances,’ may ad lib by drawing upon her wit
and prior experience. The wood turner, as she
shapes the bowl, may come upon a knot which she
decides to incorporate as a feature. Whether the
result of predetermination or serendipity, a deliberate
intervention is constituted at some stage in the
process. Without this, we return to ants and Churchill.
Aristotle (2000) regarded skill as an essentially
productive state that must involve reason. Crucially,
he saw skill as connected with ‘bringing something
into being,’ where the skill is not in the product itself
but is, instead, embedded within the process. For
Aristotle then, the first principle of something coming
into being lies in the producer and not in the
product. Thus the exercise of bringing something
into being is concerned with the production of things
that do not have their own essence, that distinctive
quality which constitutes or marks the true nature of
anything, ruling them. For Aristotle, creativity as
essence cannot reside in the artefact.  
Sartre (1997), moreover, sees this essence of a
product as preceding its existence. In other words,
the notion of what a product actually is exists in the
mind of its creator prior to its manifestation,
whether in the form of a performance, a painting or
the manufacture of a vacuum cleaner. This
distinction between existence and essence, or
between the concepts of ‘that it is’ and ‘what it is’
appear to be two independent dimensions of being.
Feenberg (2005), exemplifies this in his outline of
the Greeks’ notion of technê where the idea, the
essence of the thing is a reality, independent of the
artifact or the maker. The purpose of the object
made is included in its idea. 
It is in the eye of the beholder, however, that the
notion of creativity is invested upon the actor’s
performance, the painter’s painting or the vacuum
cleaner’s design. It is thus the signature of the
creator and not the manufacturer (unless they are
one and the same) that resides in the object which,
in terms of form or function, is subject to external
cultural validation. The performer may feel surges of
creativity whilst practicing alone but will always need
another human consciousness to endorse that
feeling (Kainz, 1994).
Creative development is consequently reliant upon
social factors. If there is no reciprocity, or feedback,
the creative process cannot be established. Vygotsky
(2000) makes the distinction between natural or
genetic animal attributes and the unique human
characteristic of making. The distinction is that
creativity cannot be a process of nature or biological
development. A flower does not make a conscious
decision to be yellow nor to shed its petals.
Furthermore it does not seek attention for so doing.
(Humans may intervene but the flower does not seek
attention). An ant does not design and build an anthill;
it is genetically disposed to so do. Ants do not
‘improve’ their environment over time. Creativity is
inextricably linked with human sociocultural
inheritance, which involves activity and interaction with
others. Without this collaboration, there can never be
any certainty for the performer that her act was indeed
creative. Action and endorsement are thus necessarily
constituted within each other before any creative act
can evolve. Moreover, any synthesis between creative
performance and public endorsement is reinforced by
the cultural value placed upon the event. 
An example of this cultural endorsement can be
seen in law and copyright legislation. The term
‘works of artistic craftsmanship’ appears in the
copyright legislation of Canada, the US, Australia
and the UK, as well as many other countries. It is
considered a type of work for which the creator is
entitled to copyright protection (Rushton. 2000).
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Under United Kingdom statute law, Section 4 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 defines
‘artistic work’ as including ‘a work of artistic
craftsmanship’. Copyright law in Australia, which is
contained in their Copyright Act of 1968, has strong
similarities with the UK. For an artifact to be
protected by copyright as a work of artistic
craftsmanship, the maker must have used ‘craft’
and intended the article to have aesthetic appeal,
rather than being purely functional (Australian
Copyright Council. 2001).
This suggests that, from a copyright point of view at
least, there exists a distinction within ‘artistic
craftsmanship’ between the ‘artistic’ and the
technical aspects of ‘craft’. This is exemplified in the
court case under Scots Law of Radley Gowns Ltd v
Costas Spyrou [1975] FSR 455:
‘The plaintiff company claimed that it owned
copyright in a prototype dress, sketches of the dress
and cutting patterns. It was held that the prototype
dress was not a work of artistic craftsmanship
because the artistry was provided by the drawings
of the dress and the craftsmanship was provided by
the cutter and the seamstress. There was therefore
a division of the artistic elements of the work and
the plaintiffs’ action failed’ (Radley v Spyro, 2004)
In this case the craftsmanship of the cutter and the
seamstress is seen to take on a purely instrumental
or utilitarian role. This is echoed in contemporary US
copyright law which protects:
‘works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article … shall be
considered a [copyrightable] work only if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are being capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article’
(In Rushton, 2000).
Essentially, the artistic or creative acts involved in
the production of an artifact exist only within the
process and the creator and not within the product
or maker.
There is, I would suggest, an overwhelming
consensus that Michelangelo’s ‘David’ constitutes
more than a modified slab of marble. It is,
undoubtedly, made from marble which is a natural
geological construct formed over many years. It
required to be carefully separated from a larger mass
of marble using the appropriate technologies
available at the time. This would have required
careful planning or intentionallity, and precise work by
the artisans at the quarry. The intention had to be
worked out in advance. The separation of a slab this
size could not be left to chance. If the project failed
and the slab was destroyed the artisans would be
considered as technically incompetent and certainly
not craftsmen. This notion of technical craftsmanship
applies as much today as it would have then.  For
Collingwood (1958) and Arendt (1998), technical
craftsmanship, is the distinction between means and
ends. The actions required to achieve the separation
of the slab of marble are the means and the separate
slab of marble is the end. Collingwood, moreover, like
Sartre, sees the essence of the end product, in this
case a separate, intact slab of marble of certain
dimension, as preceding its means of separation. 
‘The craftsman’s skill is his knowledge of the means
necessary to realize a given end, and his mastery of
these means. A joiner making a table shows his skill
by knowing what materials and what tools are
needed to make it, and being able to use these in
such a way as to produce the table exactly as
specified’ (Collingwood, 1958: 28).
The means in the form of the actions of the artisans
at the quarry vanished after the ends had been
achieved. (‘The process disappears in the product’
as Marx said). Given that a slab of marble had been
constituted according to Michelangelo’s
specification, their technical craftsmanship could in
some sense be reified1 in the object of their craft
just as the skills of the child are reified in the
finished product in the classroom. But this reification
can only exist as long as the object exists in its
crafted form and is explicitly related to the particular
craftsman or child. 
Arendt (1998: 143-144) sees this distinction
between technical and artistic craftsmanship
correlating with whether or not the artefact’s end is
beyond doubt. For her, where the subject’s purpose
is merely to apply his body, mediated only by tools,
towards the production of a pre-specified end which
has ‘…a definite beginning and a definite,
predictable end [which] is the mark of fabrication,
[and] which through this characteristic alone
distinguishes itself from all other human activities’, is
an act of technical craftsmanship.
This instrumental notion of the process of making
constitutes the distinction between technical
craftsmanship and artistic craftsmanship.
Michelangelo would have had the intention to create
‘David’ and therefore have some conception of its
final form. He would also have made many planning
sketches. The significant difference, however, is that
where a joiner exercises technical craftsmanship in
manufacturing or making a table based upon a
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specification, or a dressmaker fabricates a dress
from a specified pattern, the end product will be
predictable and reproducible. If a technically
proficient sculptor could have made ‘David’ from
Michelangelo’s specification, Michelangelo’s output
would undoubtedly have increased considerably by
the simple specification of his various sculptures and
paintings for others to execute. But this is clearly not
the case. The outcome of Michelangelo’s ‘David’
was no more predictable that was the outcome of
his Sistine Chapel ceiling. It cannot simply be that
Michelangelo had significantly greater technical
craftsmanship that anyone else. Technique can be
learned. It can only be that Michelangelo had some
creative ability unique to him alone. 
This distinction between technical craftsmanship and
artistic craftsmanship can perhaps be better
illustrated by considering the creation of the
anglepoise lamp. The design of this lamp is credited
to George Carwardine (1887-1948). He designed the
lamp as an office or desk lamp which enabled the
user to control the position and direction of the light
source. Carwardine, like Michelangelo would have
made several planning sketches as he worked
towards his final design. The inspiration for the
mechanics was derived largely from the biological
functioning of the human arm, where a spring
substituted for muscle. However, unlike Michelangelo,
Carwardine would have produced a precise set of
working drawings and specifications for the lamp.
These were then handed to Herbert Terry in Redditch
who set up a mass production system in order to
fabricate the lamp. Jacob Jacobson, a Norwegian
engineer, bought the production rights and refined the
design into what is considered to be a classic design
of the twentieth century.
The creative element in the production of the
anglepoise lamp was thus clearly embedded in the
process of design and the fabrication rested with
those workers on the production line. The difference
in this example from that of Michelangelo, is the
complete separation of design from fabrication. The
designer of the lamp has no need to be involved in
the fabrication process. He may make a prototype
model in order to refine his design and some other
being may be involved in the ‘design for
manufacture’ process. However, an individual or
complete workforce will be responsible for
fabrication which will be a completely separate
process. This process will require technique which
implies a degree of skill. However, that skill is
situated completely within the domain of means, the
ends having been firmly established prior to
fabrication. Moreover, mass production, as in the
case of the anglepoise lamp, has instituted
evermore sophisticated automation to take over the
lower order skills once offered by a human, thus the
domain of means is more and more reduced to
‘automated machine ends’, which ultimately will
exclude the human from the fabrication process
altogether. In this case, if a machine was
responsible for the complete fabrication of the
anglepoise lamp, (which is not beyond the realms of
possibility), from the cutting and shaping of the raw
materials through to the final assembly or fabrication
of the lamp, the creative process could only rest with
the human designers of the lamp and to an extent,
those who designed the manufacturing process. As
we move closer towards complete and evermore
sophisticated automated production we become
evermore reliant upon computer control. This control
has to be programmed by humans. Until an
automated production line is capable of intentional,
cognitive and deliberate free expression, creativity
will rest with the human designer and not the
automated or human fabricator.
There must therefore exist some creative element
beyond technical craftsmanship which resides within
the human and not within the object. It is artistic
craftsmanship in ‘which the artist transcends his skill
and workmanship in a way similar to the way each
person‘s uniqueness transcends the sum total of his
qualities’ (Arendt, 1998, p210). It is within artistic
craftsmanship that resides both creativity and
technical skill, and artistic craftsmanship cannot be
reified in the product alone in the way that technical
craftsmanship can. 
Implications for assessment
An instrumental view of assessment relies upon an
expert/transmission model in which positive
technical knowledge is related to prescribed
outcomes. These outcomes are subsequently
assessed in a summative way to provide
quantitative results which society, through
Government, can exploit for future production and
potential economic development. 
‘In this context, the only role positive knowledge can
play is to inform the practical subject about the
reality within which the execution of the prescription
is to be inscribed. It allows the subject to
circumscribe the executable, or what it is possible to
do. But the executory, what should be done, is not
within the purview of positive knowledge. It is one
thing for an undertaking to be possible and another
for it to be just’ (Lyotard, 2001:36). 
If an artifact is assessed in order to establish the
positive level of skill that the child has developed,
and this positive (or negative) level of prescribed
skill is manifest in the object, then this forms the
basis of what Lyotard describes as ‘the reality (the
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artifact) within which the execution (making) of the
prescription (taught skills) is to be inscribed (reified)’.
It is thus the reproduction of a prescribed set of
skills involving the use of tools, which evolve out of
socio-historical and cultural inheritance that is being
assessed. The positive (or negative) level of the
prescribed psychomotor skills in the use of tools is
made manifest in the quality of the artifact produced.
This is subsequently assessed by an expert (the
teacher) who assigns a number, which in turn
informs the child about how close the execution of
their psychomotor skills in the use of tools conforms
to the norm. The less they do so, the more the child
is expected to concentrate on perfecting these skills.
In so doing a shift in emphasis occurs.  Instead of
Kimbell and Perry’s (2001:8) notion of creative
environments such as a design and technology
classrooms being ‘packed with opportunities to
explore and exploit designerly hunches’, there is
movement towards  a conformity of  performance
model, in which strategic skill development or
ultimately perhaps, work avoidance resulting from
failure, becomes the norm.   
Martin (2000:90-91) illustrates this model when
describing what he terms ‘stasis’ in any conformist
non-creative activity: ‘…the complexity of the
manufacturing process, and its sequential nature, in
which each step is crucially dependent upon the
meticulous and precise completion of the previous
stage, tends to produce ‘lock-in’. Variation and
innovation become increasingly hazardous’. 
If a child has difficulty with the manipulation of a
particular instrument or tool and this results in a
poorly formed artifact, it is our duty to help in some
way, not impose some degree of hierarchical
measure upon it. To do so produces the potential for
any creative impulse which might lead to the
achievement of optimal performance in manufacture
to be completely obscured by the child’s failure, or
fear of failure.  Self-efficacy in relation to creative
potential becomes conditional upon the instrumental
aspects relating to efficiency in the psychomotor
domain. These skills will develop in children at
varying rates   Levels of proficiency attained will,
moreover be dependent upon the individual child’s
degree of interest in making. This is clearly more
likely to be enhanced in an environment which is
‘packed with opportunities to explore and exploit
designerly hunches’ (Kimbell and Perry, 2001) than
one where performance goals (the end product) are
considered more important than learning goals (the
process)  (Dweck, 2000; Ames, 1992). Creative
ability is not contingent upon sophisticated
psychomotor skills. 
Moreover, as argued in this paper, innovation or
creativity cannot be assessed from the artifact.
Creativity and innovation must rather be assessed
within a social-constructive framework. This
requires a major pedagogical shift away from
transmission models of teaching towards a model
where dialogue takes place, where failure is
acceptable, where risk is encouraged and where
the development of psychomotor skill in the use of
tools is secondary to the creative process and as a
consequence, is not assessed.
If design, innovation and creativity constitute the
design and technology bulwark, then the
‘assessment for measurement of the artifact’
paradigm must be removed from the citadel and the
real purpose of design and technology education
restored. That purpose must be to help the
formation of ‘creative’ citizens in a technologically
mediated world by introducing them to a design and
technology environment which assesses, develops
and encourages the essence of the child’s creativity
rather than the product of the child’s labour.
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